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Abstract—Social Network Systems (SNSs) are the predom-
inant kind of web service around the world. They attract
many users seeking popularity, entertainment and network
building, along with ease of use. Most current SNSs are based
on centralized designs, which are less likely to improve privacy
since there is a single and central authority with exclusive
administration control over user information. Many propos-
als have been introduced that work towards decentralizing
the infrastructure support in order to enhance privacy in
SNSs. However, designing decentralized social network systems
(DSNS) driven by privacy is a hard task because privacy is
impacted by most design choices. This paper proposes a multi-
criteria analysis grid designed to evaluate several properties
of SNSs related to privacy trade-offs. Based on the analysis
grid result, this paper also presents the application of lattice-
based tools to classify and visualize social network systems in
privacy-related hierarchies.
Keywords-privacy; social network systems; evaluation; lat-
tices;
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy in our online society has proven difficult to
achieve. Many concerns about data privacy are related to the
information sharing occurring in Social Network Systems
(SNSs). A widely accepted definition of SNSs was provided
by Boyd and Ellison [1], who describe social network
sites as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1)
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they
share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of
connections and those made by others within the system.”
According to Nielsen [5], SNSs are the most visited
worldwide websites and gather a huge amount of sensitive
information in data centers. As a consequence, a variety of
privacy shortcomings have arisen in current SNSs, mainly
because of their centralized infrastructure. As an example,
SNSs service providers usually have unlimited access to
users’ information and total control over its retention and
use. Therefore, users are not left with much control over
how their personal data is collected, used and disseminated.
Aı¨meur, Gambs and Ho [9] define privacy-enhanced SNSs as
SNSs with: (1) privacy awareness and customization, to help
users take informed decisions about information sharing, (2)
data minimization, to ensure that only necessary information
is collected and processed, and (3) data sovereignty, to
ensure that users remain in control of their data. These
very general properties still need to relate to the design
choices leading to them. Among them, decentralization
seems to us a promising and efficient way to put users in
control and ensure the privacy of their information. Indeed,
decentralization tends to be seen as a transfer of control
and services from service providers to users, giving privacy
protection a leading role in the specifications.
Many alternative SNSs use decentralized data and/or
services in order to enhance privacy by keeping personal
data on users’ devices and maintaining policy enforcement
out of the control of a single entity. However, the absence of
a central server introduces certain difficulties in managing
the infrastructure support. In particular, one should provide
a balance between privacy protection on the one hand, and
security, data availability and usability on the other hand. In
fact, each solution focuses on decentralizing some specific
design points according to a prioritization of trade-offs
based on the designer’s preferences. Therefore, the emerging
challenge is to evaluate, compare and classify the existing
SNSs according to their core design choices, which are not
obvious nor direct for the SNS designer.
If we accept that decentralization of data and services
enhances the general level of privacy, then it will be useful
to be able to evaluate a given solution according to its actual
design choices, in terms of decentralization. We believe that
such a measure would be a relevant rating of its privacy-
friendliness. In this perspective, we propose to classify
privacy-related properties in a multi-criteria analysis grid
based on degrees of decentralization. We think that such
a grid can be useful in a Privacy by Design methodology
to develop SNSs. Indeed, based on the grid, it is possible
to organize privacy-related design choices in a lattice and
benefit from the associated formal structure to compare and
classify SNSs based on sets of technical options.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
context related to social network systems. Section III de-
scribes the privacy-related properties we find relevant to SNS
design. Section IV presents the multi-criteria grid analysis
based on degrees of decentralization and its application to
social network systems. In section V we present the lattice
structure used to systematically organize sets of privacy-
related design choices into hierarchical structures. Section
VI compares our approach with related works. We finally
offer a conclusion and propose future research tracks.
II. SOCIAL NETWORK SYSTEMS
A. Centralized Social Network Systems
SNSs are a well-established global market phenomenon.
They provide various benefits to users, such as availability
of web space to create their profiles and the ability to estab-
lish bonds with their friends, relatives and acquaintances.
All these features are specifically designed to be easily
usable, even by beginners. In addition, a SNS is a central
place to benefit from several applications offered by the
service provider and third parties, such as music and games.
Common examples are Facebook1, Twitter2, LinkedIn3 or
MySpace4.
Such centralized systems are relatively easy to design and
allow to set up services useful to both parties. However,
centralization of user data and usage control is a signifi-
cant threat to users’ privacy, as made obvious by several
recent abuses5. From the point of view of privacy policy
management, the central authority imposes a global policy,
but every single user may also have his own one. However,
these policies are not on the same level and the central
authority may constrain user policies, which usually do not
even apply to it. Moreover, recent studies have also shown
that few users actually read privacy policies, and that policies
published by SNS providers typically require college-level
reading skills [2]. Beyond that, these policies may not reflect
adequately their actual use of user data [12]. User privacy
policies are often implemented in SNSs as access control
policies. Yet, there are usually no access control policies
between users and the service provider. As a consequence
of the (often) unlimited access to user information, SNSs
providers may perform data mining and profile analysis for
targeted advertisement, and usually sublicense this valuable
information in order to generate income.
B. Decentralized Social Network Systems
To overcome the issues raised by centralized control,
several alternative platforms have been proposed. These
systems introduce distinct degrees of decentralization to
enhance privacy. The Diaspora network6 is an open-source
SNS project based on a decentralized architecture using
servers called “PoDs”. Each public PoD can be connected
with a set of clients called “seeds”. PoDs are in charge of
profile data storage (in their local database), contact search
(by querying other PoDs) and information retrieval.
PeerSoN [14], [8] is a decentralized SNS using an external
P2P infrastructure called OpenDHT. An OpenDHT overlay
can be seen as a set of super-peers, which will provide
1https://www.facebook.com/
2https://twitter.com/
3http://www.linkedin.com/
4http://www.myspace.com/
5http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/
6http://diasporaproject.org/
lookup services and maintain profile information in a dis-
tributed hash table, in the form of key-value pairs. Each peer
can use the services provided by the super-peers to locate
the peer in charge of a given piece of data and directly
communicate with this peer to retrieve the data.
PrivacyWatch [9], [7] is a hybrid (partially decentralized)
approach that focuses on the trade-off between privacy and
usability. In this context the client privacy manager (CPM)
is a browser plug-in which helps users to set their privacy
level and privacy preferences. After that, the mail server is
used by the CPM to create an e-mail account used for key
sharing. The SNS provider is used for searching friends and
storing encrypted personal information.
Safebook [4], in a nutshell, is a decentralized SNS, using
a structure called matryoshka, which can be described as
a set of concentric rings of nodes built around each user
node in order to provide trusted data storage, profile data
retrieval, communication obfuscation and anonymization
through indirection. A lookup service is provided in the P2P
architecture for finding entry-points for matryoshkas, using
pseudonyms provided by the trusted identification system.
FOAF (Friend-Of-A-Friend) [10] is an attempt to improve
data interoperability in SNSs. It uses an ontology to describe
people by their attributes (foaf:person elements) and
their social connections (foaf:knows). Users are put in
control by allowing them to decide which server will store
their FOAF profile.
Finally, SuperNova [13] focuses on data availability in
decentralized SNSs. Super-peers provide data storage and
lookup services to peers that do not have enough friends in
the SNS. Storekeepers do the same but only for their friends
Thus, to ensure data availability, each peer can ask its friends
to become storekeepers for its data. When this peer is down,
its data can still be accessed through its storekeepers.
III. PRIVACY-RELATED PROPERTIES FOR SNSS
The cited works aim to improve different aspects of user
privacy, by focusing on different design choice points. Here
we have identified the main core design choices to be
integrated into the design of an SNS through the following
properties. We conceived these properties to be a synthesis
of the trade-offs in the existing approaches. In our opinion,
bringing more decentralization to the different aspects of
SNS design is likely to improve the general level of pri-
vacy, by avoiding the too significant influence of a central
authority. Therefore, we choose to evaluate privacy-related
properties with respect to the degree of decentralization
assigned to it in the SNS design.
A. Degree of decentralization
We consider three degrees of decentralization: (i) central-
ized (C), (ii) decentralized (D) and (iii) fully decentralized
(FD), which correspond to the columns in the grid in section
IV.
Centralized SNSs have a strongly hierarchical structure.
There is a single and central authority with exclusive ad-
ministration control. Centralized SNSs have a star network
topology, meaning that all peers are directly connected with
the central authority. This is typically implemented as a
client-server organization, the central authority being in
charge of communication routing, friend search and content
retrieval on behalf of the peers.
A first step in decentralization is to avoid the unicity of
this central authority and to allow for local, autonomous
authorities to emerge. Such an organization correspond
to the decentralized category in our classification. These
systems have a hybrid network topology including a set
of autonomous authorities with local administration control
(sometimes known as “super-peers”), as well as ordinary
peers.
The next step is to build a fully decentralized SNS,
where each peer can be seen as a punctual authority. Neither
peers nor the network itself are organized in a hierarchical
structure. All peers are equals in terms of service providing
and control over data. Interactions are usually implemented
through direct communication between peers.
B. Description of Privacy-related Properties
Privacy-related properties correspond to the rows in the
grid in section IV. To each of these properties corresponds
a gradation along the decentralization scale previously in-
troduced.
1) Architectural Services: They cover the main services
provided by the SNS, such as search, data retrieval and
communication. Search is the mechanism to locate data and
peers in SNSs. Data retrieval is the mechanism through
which data is exchanged among entities (peers, service
provider and third parties). Communication is how data is
transmitted among entities.
• Search
– C: Only the central authority is in charge of
searching friends/content for all peers.
– D: A given set of autonomous authorities are in
charge of searching friends/content for all peers.
– FD: The set of all peers are in charge of searching
friends/content for all peers.
2) Storage: It describes how information is kept in the
system. One important feature related to storage is data
availability. Often, SNSs apply replication techniques to
make data redundant. We propose three properties: Storage
space tells us where peer data is stored, replication indi-
cates which entity is in charge of replicating profiles and
resources, and data suppression specifies which entity has
the power to delete data from the system (for instance, when
a user closes their account).
3) Security Aspects of Privacy: They correspond to the
mechanisms used to protect data confidentiality and integrity
as well as peers’ identities and activities. Most privacy reg-
ulations require that personal information be kept secure. To
characterize these properties, we first introduce an attacker
model which will allow us to define our three degrees of
decentralization in the context of security and privacy. In our
attacker model, each attacker is able to fully compromise
one or several entities in the system, and its aim is to
affect all the peers of the SNS with respect to a given
property. For a centralized property, the attacker need only
to compromise the central authority in order to affect all
peers. For a decentralized property, he must compromise
a given set of autonomous authorities in order to affect
all peers. Finally, for a fully decentralized property, the
attacker must compromise all peers in order to affect all
peers.
Two properties relate directly to encryption. They tell us
which entity controls encryption and decryption of data, in
the case of data encryption, or of communications, in the
case of traffic communication encryption.
• Data encryption / Traffic communication encryption
– C: Only the central authority must be compromised
in order to decrypt data of all peers.
– D: A given set of autonomous authorities must be
compromised in order to decrypt data of all peers.
– FD: The set of all peers must be compromised in
order to decrypt data of all peers.
The following four properties are more specifically about
privacy protection. Anonymity measures the capacity of a
peer to perform an action within the SNS without disclosing
its identity. One should note that this classification assumes
the existence of a trusted authority either as a central
authority for C or as a set of autonomous authorities for
D. Therefore, C and D have a weak notion of anonymity
and only FD is able to provide anonymity stricto sensu.
Pseudonymity measures his capacity to perform an action
within the SNS without disclosing its identity, and still
be accountable for that action. Unlinkability measures the
impossibility to establish correspondence between two inde-
pendent and different actions performed by the same peer.
In the SNS context, unobservability means the capacity of
a peer to perform an action without others being aware of
these actions.
4) Privacy Policy Management: It encompasses policy
administration and policy enforcement. The policy admin-
istration property describes which entity is in charge of
the definition and modification of policies, whereas the
policy enforcement property tells us at which level the
privacy policy is enforced. Both properties relate to two
kinds of policies: system policies and peer policies. The
system policy applies to the whole platform and governs
the rights of the SNS provider, when it exists. Peer policies
regulate privacy preferences among peers. The latter can be
more or less rich and expressive depending on the systems:
peer policies can range from imposed, system-wide rules to
individually negotiated agreements between pairs of peers.
IV. THE MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS GRID
We now propose to organize the privacy-related properties
previously described in a two-dimensional grid: each line
corresponds to one property (belonging to one of the four
groups detailed in section III-B), each column to a degree
of decentralization. The degree of decentralization has been
chosen as the evaluation criterion since we believe that the
distribution of services and data has a significant impact on
the global level of privacy of the system. In this respect
we adopt the following scale: Unknown (?) means that
there is no available information in the SNS specification;
Nonexistent (0) means that the privacy-related property is
explicitly not addressed or not implemented in the SNS;
Centralized (C), decentralized (D) and fully decentralized
(FD) are as defined in section III-A.
We apply our approach to seven SNSs and present the
result in table I. For the sake of brevity we only detail
the analysis of one examples, namely Facebook, the largest
and most successful centralized social network in the world,
having more than one billion users.
Architectural Services provided by the SNS to users are
mainly based on a centralized architecture where search,
communication and information retrieval services are op-
erated by a central entity, the service provider at Facebook,
and only the result is provided to users on the client side.
Storage is centralized in Facebook’s cluster of around
180,000 web and database servers. Facebook replicate the
complete user profiles across their data center. Data suppres-
sion does not seems to be implemented, because Facebook
apparently remains with users’ data for an indetermined
time, arguing safeguard against legal measures.
Security Aspects of Privacy rely on traffic communication
encryption using SSL/TLS in order to provide security of the
communication between the user’s browser and Facebook’s
servers. Regarding this property, if Facebook servers are
compromised, then the attacker will be able to decrypt all
further traffic7. Data encryption is marked as nonexistent,
because Facebook itself does not provide users with options
to encrypt their data. Anonymity property is marked as
nonexistent, since any communication is linked to a user’s
personal account, itself based on a real-life identity (per the
Facebook terms of service). Pseudonymity is also marked
as nonexistent, for the same reason. Regarding unlinkability
and unobservability, it must be noted that some actions (like
people search or profile consultation) are visible and linkable
only by Facebook as the central authority, while other (like
status updating or public messaging) are visible and linkable
by other users. Given the limited level of granularity we
7Of course, if one trusted Certification Authority (CA) is compromised,
then it allows for man-in-the-middle attacks. This is true for all platforms
relying on SSL/TLS and is left outside the scope of this analysis.
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Table I
THE MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS GRID APPLIED AT SNSS PROPOSALS.
have chosen in our analysis, we must then conclude that
unlinkability and unobservability are of the centralized kind
in Facebook.
Privacy Policy Management in Facebook is centralized
for anything (administration and enforcement) regarding the
system access control policy, imposed by the contractual
terms of Facebook. Users also have the ability to set up what
we have called a peer policy, also focused on access control.
More specifically, users can categorize all of their contacts
in groups sharing the same access rights. Furthermore,
users can specify which posts and photos the audience may
access based on the following presets: “public”, “friends”,
“custom”, “close friends”, “family”, “acquaintances” and
“only me”. However, the policy of each user is stored
on Facebook’s central servers, which therefore makes a
peer policy administration centralized, since only the central
authority needs to be compromised in order to modify peer
policies. Regarding enforcement, Facebook is of course in
charge of both the system policy and peer policies, since
decision taking and actual delivery of information take place
on the servers.
V. LATTICES
We now propose to apply lattice theory to classify and
visualize the analyzed SNSs. Lattices provide a mathemat-
ical foundation by systematically ordering pairs of objects
into a hierarchical structure. According to [6], an order is
a binary relation on a set of objects in mathematical terms.
A binary relation R on a set V is called an order relation
if it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. Additionally,
if xRy or yRx for all x, y in V , then the order is total,
otherwise it is partial. An ordered set (V, ≤) is a lattice if
it is a partially ordered set in which any two elements x, y
have a supremum x ∨ y and an infimum x ∧ y. Lattices are
useful since they allow to represent an partially ordered set
of objects diagrammatically.
In our proposal, the lattice diagram is built considering
the degrees of decentralization as a total order relation,
defined as: fully decentralized (fd) > decentralized (d) >
centralized (c) > unknown (?) > nonexistent (0). SNSs near
the top node will then be considered “more decentralized”
in general, and therefore better for privacy according to our
hypothesis. Classification based on this kind of lattice has
been done considering chains and levels. Two SNSs are in
the same chain if they can be directly compared according
to the lattice structure and its partial order. We will then note
a ≺ b if a precedes b, that is if it is higher in the chain. If
two SNSs are not in the same chain, then we need another
tool to compare them. We will say that they are at the same
level if they appear in the same stratum of the lattice, i.e.
at the same distance from the top node. If two SNSs are
at the same level but in different chains, is not possible to
compare them without making priority choices among the
privacy-related properties.
A simplified example, limited to two properties, is pre-
sented in Figure 1. Note that lattice structures increase
expontially as the number of properties grows, therefore it is
not easy to represent the full structure. This lattice illustrates
the fact that the analysis grid results can be used as an input
to compare SNSs. This lattice in Figure 1 is a projection on
two privacy-related properties: data encryption, represented
by the letter A, and traffic communication encryption, rep-
resented by B. Both A and B range over the set of values
{fd , d , c, ?, 0}.
This lattice allows us to identify significant hierarchical
relationships based on chain comparisons, represented by the
following expressions:
PeerSoN ,PrivacyWatch,SuperNova ≺ FOAF
Figure 1. Lattice based on the Data Encryption (A) and Traffic Commu-
nication Encryption (B) properties.
Safebook ≺ Facebook Diaspora ≺ Facebook
It means that, for instance, Diaspora is “better” than Face-
book (with respects to the considered properties). On the
other hand, comparisons based on levels allow us to con-
clude that PrivacyWatch, PeerSoN and SuperNova, all at
fourth level, are “better”, still with respects to the considered
properties but in a less direct way, than Safebook (fifth level),
Diaspora (sixth level) and Facebook (seventh level). Finally,
it is not possible to compare Facebook and FOAF, because
they are in the same level but in different chains. Comparing
them can only be done by considering other properties
and/or setting priorities among them. This kind of lattice
structure comes along with its own set of operators and
algorithms, which remain to be explored and adapted to the
analysis of SNSs. We expect our now basic comparison tools
to be improved by the further integration of the mathematical
properties of algebraic lattice.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In [9], Aı¨meur & al. have proposed a taxonomy of
SNSs mainly according to the data sovereignty principle,
understood as giving each user the control of his personal
data. Thus, the taxonomy focuses on privacy requirements
such as the capacity for each user to define his privacy
policy in a user-friendly way, to track on how his personal
information is used or to report spam or abuse. Since data
sovereignty basically means taking control from the central
authority and giving it to the peers, it is a process of feature
decentralization, captured by our classification. This is why
we consider that our analysis grid is more general than this
specific taxonomy.
Paul & al. have also proposed a taxonomy of SNSs based
on the degree of decentralization of the basic SNS features
such as the architectural services or those related to data
storage [15]. Thus, they identify SNSs such as FOAF and
Diaspora, that use trusted servers to provide these features,
and those that are based on P2P systems, such as Safebook
and PeerSoN. However, they do not take into account the
security aspects of privacy nor privacy policy management.
Thus, the aforementioned works do not cover the complete
set of properties present in our approach for evaluating the
level of privacy of SNSs. Our taxonomy is based on the
degree of decentralization of all the privacy-related prop-
erties, in relation to architectural services, storage, security
and policy management. Furthermore, using lattices makes
it possible to compare and identify which SNS “scores best”
with regards to each specific property.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we have examined the concerns arising from
centralized social network systems, as well as the current
prominent approaches that try to overcome these problems
through decentralization of SNS data and services. The
efforts engaged to protect user data in decentralized SNSs
aim at keeping the data with the users, on their personal
devices, and at developing SNSs using privacy by design
principles.
We have chosen to put a stress on various design proper-
ties which can be set at various degrees of decentralization,
thus impacting the overall privacy level of the application.
We have organized these properties, all related to privacy
issues, in several families: architectural services, storage,
privacy policy management and security aspects of privacy.
Based on the hypothesis that avoiding central authorities
limits the risks of abuse, we have developed a multi-
criteria analysis grid to analyze and evaluate SNSs in this
respect. Algebraic lattice theory can then be applied to this
grid, allowing to build a comprehensive structure aimed
at identifying which SNS performs better with respects to
a given property, and more generally at comparing SNS
platforms in terms of privacy protection. Using the proposed
lattice structure, it is possible to classify, evaluate and
visualize different SNSs within a partial hierarchy based on
lattice chains and levels. We believe such a graphical and
computational tool to be a useful and usable contribution to
privacy by design techniques, allowing SNS designers in the
specification phase to distinguish current best practices and
to find out how to improve them for the sake of privacy.
Future works include enrichment of the grid with prop-
erties specifically linked to the privacy policies themselves,
especially in terms of expressivity. We believe that this is
another dimension along which it would be interesting to
compare SNSs. Another possible track is the development
of software components dedicated to the achievement of a
given level of decentralization for a set of given properties.
Such modular and reusable software, deeply linked to our
analysis tools, could also find a place in a privacy by design
conception framework.
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